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Abstract: An indirect report typically takes the form of a speaker using the locution “said 
that” to report an earlier utterance. In what follows, I introduce the principal 
philosophical and pragmatic points of interest in the study of indirect reports, including 
the extent to which context sensitivity affects the content of an indirect report, the 
constraints on the substitution of co-referential terms in reports, the extent of felicitous 
paraphrase and translation, the way in which indirect reports are opaque, and the use of 
indirect reports as pragmatic vehicles for other speech acts such as humor, insult, or 
irony. Throughout I develop several positions: (i) that a semantic analysis of indirect 
reports is insufficient, (ii) that the distinction between direct and indirect reports is not 
clear and that indirect reports are the predominate way of reporting while direct reports 
may be a para-linguistic variation on them, (iii) that most questions about the semantics 
and pragmatics of indirect reports will rely on a full understanding of the nature of what 
is reported and how it gets reported, (iv) that an analysis of reporting requires the 
pragmatic tools of metarepresentation and a social, inter-personal understanding of 
relevance and shared knowledge. !
   !!
1. Introduction: Direct and indirect reports !
The philosophical literature is rich with discussion of quotation and indirect reports. It 
has played a starring role in the philosophy of language at least since Donald Davidson’s 
(1968) “On Saying That.” Much of this literature has concluded that the analysis of 
indirect reports should be largely pragmatic. Unfortunately, there has been a scarcity of 
accounts of what a pragmatic theory of indirect reports should look like, how, if at all, it 
should complement a semantic account of indirect reports, and how such a pragmatic 
account can respond to some of the most interesting philosophical questions about 
reporting. Whereas quotations are used to directly report the utterances of another, the 
indirect report has far more latitude. The result is that indirect reports have most of the 
same features that make direct reports so philosophically interesting and many unique 
features that make them especially pragmatically interesting.  
!  1
 An indirect report typically takes the form of a speaker using the locution “said 
that” to report on an earlier utterance (e.g. “Galileo said that the earth moves”). The 
original utterance could come from the speaker herself or a third party; the contexts of the 
original and reported utterances could be identical or distinct. Indirect reports differ from 
direct reports in that they typically do not use quotation (in written form with quotation 
marks or in spoken form with implied quotation marks) (e.g., “Galileo said, ‘the earth 
moves’”). Or, if they do, they take the form of mixed-quotation where part of the report is 
direct and part indirect (e.g., “Galileo said that the earth ‘moves’”).  
In one notable philosophical discussion of indirect reports, Cappelen & Lepore 
(1997b) argue that semanticists will have little to say about the most linguistically 
interesting features of indirect reports. The reason for this is that semanticists are 
interested in the most general and systematic features of linguistic expressions, whereas 
speakers, when they report, are interested in reporting something narrow and particular 
about a context and an utterance in that context. It is no surprise to Cappelen & Lepore 
that the aims of a semanticist in analyzing ‘to say’ and a reporter in using ‘said that’ 
differ. It’s worth considering their claim at length:  
[Semanticists] tend to agree that semantics is a discipline that aims to characterize 
systematically certain features of linguistic expressions and to do so in a way that 
captures general truths about our linguistic practice, not just truths about particular 
speakers in particular contexts. Indirect speech, on the other hand, is a device reporters 
use for characterizing acts (utterances) performed by other speakers. In so doing, 
reporters are interested neither in systematicity nor in generality; they aim to convey 
something about a particular act in a particular context C to a particular audience situated 
in a different context C*. Reporters draw on information about the specific intentions of, 
knowledge about, and the history of a reported speaker in C and (maybe) similar features 
of an audience in C*. These are features one does not want to solicit when the aim is 
systematic and general.  1!
The present discussion both accepts and rejects Cappelen & Lepore’s central claims in 
this passage. I will accept that the aims of the semanticist and the speaker differ, and I 
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 Cappelen & Lepore (1997b), pg. 289. Note that Cappelen & Lepore’s aim is totally different from the aim 1
of this paper. They say that it is because reporters are doing these things that we should not expect a 
semantic analysis to capture reports. Their goal is to protect semantics from what look like threatening 
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will accept that the semanticist does not have a comprehensive analysis of ‘to say’ 
available to her. But I will reject that there are no general and systematic claims that can 
be made about the pragmatics of indirect reports. Although speakers are attempting to 
“convey something about a particular act in a particular context C to a particular audience 
situated in a different context C*” when they indirectly report, they still do so in 
systematic ways, and under identifiable constraints.  
 In what follows, I introduce the principal philosophical and pragmatic points of 
interest in the study of indirect reports. I will argue that indirect reports are more 
pragmatically complicated than direct reports. They lack explicit, conventional markings 
in written text (such as italics or quotation marks), and they permit a great deal of 
communicative deviation. Presumably, a felicitous indirect report needs to convey the 
content communicated in the original utterance—but there is a fair amount of reasonable 
disagreement as to what this might constitute. Felicitous indirect reports allow for the 
substitution of co-referential terms, context shifting, translation across languages, 
paraphrase, reporting by inference, and the use of demonstratives to stand in for 
utterances. Indirect reports also work as standard pragmatic vehicles for humor, irony, 
implicature, insult, praise, etc.  
I will discuss several possible pragmatic approaches to the analysis of reports. In 
particular, I will discuss the ways in which reporting practices are similar to other forms 
of metarepresentation. I also assess the analyses available depending on whether 
language is conceived of as a verbal or written phenomenon. Philosophers have tended to 
analyze language in its written form, largely ignoring verbal communication. Linguists 
tend to do the opposite. Given that direct reports are explicitly marked only in written 
texts, we can see that a verbal orientation would suggest that analyses of direct and 
indirect reports should largely be the same. If this is the case, then much of the 
philosophical literature on quotation should be re-assessed.  
!!
2. Puzzles about indirect reports !
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2.1.Indirect reports and the use/mention distinction !
It is standard in philosophical discussions of quotation to distinguish between the use and 
mention of a term or expression. The idea is straightforward on its face: some language is 
used meta-linguistically to talk about other language. A speaker can say (1) and (2) 
coherently and felicitously: 
(1) Boston is a large American city. 
(2) ‘Boston’ has six letters. !
In (1) the term ‘Boston’ is being used; in (2) it is being mentioned. One is not saying in 
(2) that the city itself has six letters, but rather that the name of the city is comprised of 
six letters. (2) is a claim about language; (1) is a claim about the world. 
 Given this distinction it is natural to think of reports as special, meta-linguistic 
uses of language since they involve mentioning the speech of others.  Consider direct 2
reports: 
(3) The President said, “Osama bin Laden resisted.” !
In this case, the speaker of (3) is directly reporting the President’s speech; the use of 
quotation marks indicates that the speaker of (3) is merely mentioning and not using the 
words “Osama bin Laden resisted.” Now consider a case of an indirect report: 
(4) The President said that Osama bin Laden resisted.  !
Direct written reports employ an arguably semantic tool  to mark them as such, i.e., 3
quotation marks, italics, or angle brackets. Indirect reports have a less explicit tool: the 
phrase ‘said that’ or its equivalent. One possibility to consider is that the phrase ‘said that’ 
has a similar function to written quotation marks insofar as it indicates that the words to 
follow are being mentioned and not used. As we will we see in what follows, this is a 
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mentioning. Some quotation theorists (see Saka (1998) and Washington (1992)) argue that the analyses of 
quotation and mentioning will be closely related, if not the same. Others (see Cappelen & Lepore (2009)) 
disagree that quotation and mentioning correspond in this way.
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tough case to make given the varieties of indirect reports. The use/mention distinction is 
typically directed at strings of words and not at linguistic content.  
 Could there be an alternative to the use/mention distinction for indirect reports? In 
this case, there would be a distinction between a speaker using content (e.g., the 
communication of linguistic content that takes place in the original utterance) and a 
speaker mentioning content (e.g., the reporting of linguistic content that takes place in the 
indirect report). Consider (5). 
(5) Osama bin Laden resisted.  
When the President utters (5), he is using this expression in order to mean something or 
other. When a reporter utters (4), she is merely mentioning whatever it was that that the 
President meant in uttering (5), but is not attempting to mean whatever it was that the 
President himself meant with his utterance of (5). The reporter in (4) distances herself 
from the meaning conveyed by the President given that her speech act is one of reporting 
and not one of describing what unfolded in Osama bin Laden’s compound.  This 4
becomes clearer when we consider another case of indirectly reporting (5). 
(6) The President said that the leader of al-Qaeda resisted. !
In this case, the speaker is using a co-referential substitution for the name ‘Osama bin 
Laden’ (see section 2.4). In doing so the speaker is mentioning—in a manner of speaking
—what the President communicated, although not his exact locution. Admittedly, there is 
a bit of clumsiness in applying the standard use/mention distinction to indirect reports in 
this way. But this should highlight that there are interesting questions to be asked about 
what exactly is being reported in an indirect report as well as what is doing the reporting 
(see section 2.9). 
!
2.2.Indirect reports and context sensitivity !
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 Indirect reports have thus been described as containing “two voices” and as being micro-narrations. In 4
reporting, the speaker is using her own voice in order to convey the voice of another (or from another 
context); in doing so she is establishing a kind of narrative with the locution “said that” that presupposes 
both common knowledge between the reporter and audience of the reporter’s goal, and common knowledge 
of relevant features of the context of the original utterance. See Capone (2010).
Indirect reports are linguistic objects that can convey content from one context to another. 
They need not always do this (e.g., consider the case of a speaker reporting on her 
immediately prior utterance, “I said that we’re going to be late!”). When reports do 
convey content from context to context, it is essential that relevant features of the 
reported context are assumed in the reporting context. Presumptively, these features of 
the reported context would be constituted in shared knowledge.  
 Given this, we can say that indirect reports are themselves context sensitive; a 
complete understanding of the content of the report requires knowing something about 
the context in which it was uttered. It has also been argued that indirect reports 
themselves provide a test for context-sensitivity.  An aspect of the debate on the 5
appropriate divide between pragmatics and semantics has been the extent to which the 
meanings of terms are sensitive to context. Another way of thinking about this is that if 
an expression is identified as ‘context-sensitive’, then its meaning is underdetermined 
without knowledge of context. As an example, consider a clearly context-sensitive 
expression such as ‘today’ embedded in an indirect report: 
(7) Marylee said that she will arrive today. !
As reported, the content of Marylee’s original utterance is underdetermined. It depends, 
at the very least, on the day of her original utterance. (7) is a felicitous report if Marylee’s 
utterance of “I will arrive today” occurred on the same day as the utterance of (7). 
Likewise, (7) is a felicitous report if Marylee’s utterance of “I will arrive tomorrow” 
occurred the day before the utterance of (7), etc. The way in which indirect reports can 
test for the context-sensitivity of an expression is by seeing if it survives being reported 
(without quotation marks but with the same actual expression) in a new context. We can 
see that obvious indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘today’, and ‘tomorrow’, and 
demonstratives such as ‘this’ and ‘that’ do not survive this test and so must be context-
sensitive. On the other hand, other candidates for context-sensitivity such as gradable 
adjectives do pass this test—at least at first glance. For example, consider an expression 
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such as ‘is tall’. Consider whether, when embedded in an indirect report, this expression 
compromises the felicity of said report: 
(8) She said that her niece is tall. !
It’s arguable that an utterance of “My niece is tall” by the original speaker contains the 
context-sensitive expression ‘is tall’. After all, there are many ways of being tall, and 
many comparison classes against which height can be measured (e.g., tall for a seven 
year old, tall for a WNBA player). Given this context sensitivity, we might expect (8) to 
be underdetermined in the same way that (7) is. Yet, this is not obviously the case.  This 6
tells us that indirect reports themselves might provide a tool for determining the extent to 
which language is context-sensitive, and thereby provide insight to the boundary between 
semantics and pragmatics.  
! !
2.3.Indirect reports and inter-substitutability of co-referential terms !
Co-referential terms and expressions can be substituted for one another in indirect reports 
felicitously. For example: 
(9) 
A: This morning I had pancakes, toast, and coffee. 
B: A said that she had breakfast this morning. !
As we can see, inter-substitutable co-referential terms in felicitous indirect reports fail 
strict semantic analysis and yet seem to reflect our practices of indirect reporting. 
Consider this co-referential substitution: 
(10) 
A: My favorite tapa is patatas bravas. 
B: A said that her favorite tapa is the third item on your menu. !
In this case, the term ‘patatas bravas’ is substituted with a definite description with a 
value that can only be determined in the reporting context. It would be implausible to 
suggest that the original speaker meant anything like the third item on your menu in the 
original context of utterance. Nevertheless, ordinary reporting practices take advantage of 
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this sort of inter-substitution. In other cases, co-referential substitution will fail. Consider 
this case: 
(11) 
A: The word ‘mendacious’ means lying. 
B: A said that the word ‘lying’ means lying. !
While ‘mendacious’ and ‘lying’ are semantically equivalent and thereby 
intersubstitutable, it would be infelicitous to report A’s utterance in this way. (The reason 
for this is partly because (11) involves the use of quotation marks, marking this as a 
mixed report. See section 2.6.) Co-referential substitution depends largely on maintaining 
the propositional content of the original report. But indirect reports do not rely on strict 
propositional preservation; in everyday felicitous reporting contexts, propositional 
content varies so much that it casts into doubt the idea that reports of any kind require 
such preservation.  
!
2.4.Indirect reports and propositional content !
Co-referential substitution is not the only way for an indirect report to felicitously modify 
an original utterance. An examination of the varieties of indirect reports suggests that 
indirect reports need not represent the propositional content of the original utterance in its 
entirety or without alteration. This, perhaps, is the primary reason why a semantic 
analysis of indirect reports is of limited utility in comparison to a pragmatic account. For 
example, consider what we can call conjunction elimination:  7
(12) 
A: I went to the taco stand and bought a soda. 
B: A said that she went to the taco stand.  !
The propositional content of A’s utterance minimally includes two conjuncts. B’s report 
of A’s utterance leaves out one of the conjuncts, so A’s utterance and B’s report do not 
contain the same propositional content. Consider another case. Call this modifier 
elimination: 
(13) 
A: I had some delicious nachos for dinner. 
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B: A said that she had nachos for dinner. !
This is also a case where the propositional content does not survive from A’s utterance to 
B’s report. In cases such as these, the felicity of a report that alters a modifier cannot be 
determined along semantic lines. To see this, consider a related possibility, call it modifier 
introduction: 
(14) 
A: I met a woman at the party. 
*B: A said that she met a beautiful woman at the party.  !
Most (but not all) of the time, B’s report will not be felicitous. Similarly, not all cases of 
modifier elimination will be pragmatically felicitous. Consider: 
(15) 
A: I had some low-fat nachos for lunch.  
B: Did A have anything healthy to eat today? 
*C: A said that she had nachos for lunch. !
Some modifier eliminations and modifier introductions alter the original utterance in a 
pragmatically infelicitous way and some do not. These are governed by pragmatic 
constraints on relevance and not semantic rules (or so I argue in the final section of this 
paper). 
Another example of how an indirect report can modify original propositional 
content is when the report involves an inference based on the content of the reported 
utterance and knowledge of context. Consider this example of an inferential indirect 
report:  8
(16) 
A: I didn’t fail any students. 
B: Professor A said Maryanne passed her exam.  !
Just as long as B knows that Maryanne is one of A’s students, then B can felicitously 
report A’s utterance in this way. The fact that the intersubstitutability of co-referential 
terms and paraphrase on the basis of inference are not only possible but commonplace 
suggests that an indirect report does not function to replicate the original utterance, and it 
does not even function to convey content that is identical to the original utterance, but 
rather its pragmatic function is to convey whatever is relevant about the original utterance 
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to the reporter and audience given new facts about the reporting context. Relevant 
features include the word choice of the original speaker, propositional content of the 
original utterance, intonation, stress, or accent of the original utterance, the broad 
structure or word order of the original utterance, etc. Similarly, facts about the reporting 
context are just as relevant to the nature of the report. For example, if the original 
utterance is in French, and the audience only speaks Italian, the report will be a 
translation. 
 Finally, one further category of report to consider is the implicature. Consider the 
following report: 
(17)  
A: It’s awfully stuffy in here. 
?B [to C]: A said that she would like for you to open a window. !
What is interesting about this report is that it affords a natural felicitous reading and an 
equally natural infelicitous reading. The implicature that A would like for you to open a 
window is natural and readily available to B. It’s less clear that it’s felicitous to say that A 
said such a thing. This case differs from the inferential indirect report because while 
speaker A did not utter the words attributed to her by B in either case, in an inferential 
indirect report, B’s report of what A said logically follows from what A said (and other 
facts known in context). It would be reasonable for B to object that she did not say this in 
the case of a reported implicature. For either of these cases, reading them as felicitous 
requires a robustly pragmatic interpretation of ‘said that’—one that many would not be 
willing to accept. 
!!
2.5.Are indirect reports opaque? !
Given the above discussion, we can address another corollary between indirect and direct 
reports. Direct reports are typically described in the philosophical literature as ‘opaque’. 
This means that when synonymous expressions are substituted into the original utterance 
in quotation, the quotation can fail to preserve truth-value. Given the discussion in 
sections 2.3 and 2.4, we can see that indirect reports are opaque – some of the time. This 
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suggests that the locution ‘said that’ and quotation marks function similarly. However, 
opacity itself is tricky to identify. An expression is said to be opaque if exchanging 
synonymous terms alters the truth-value. A standard example looks like this: 
(18) ‘Bachelor’ has eight letters. 
(19) ‘Unmarried man’ has eight letters. !
The substitution of ‘unmarried man’ for ‘bachelor’ results in a failure to preserve truth-
value in the move from (18) to (19). But as we know from examples (9) and (10), not all 
substitutions result in a failure to preserve truth-value. (The preservation of truth-value in 
examples (9) and (10) is not merely coincidental but is, in part, a consequence of the 
flexibility inherent in indirect reports.) However, consider the following indirect report: 
 (20)  
  A: Superman can fly. 
  ?B: A said that Clark Kent can fly. !
Is this report felicitous? The answer here is not obvious. On one hand, it is plausible to 
say that B’s report in (20) is not felicitous because, at the very least, A would not accept 
B’s paraphrase of what she said.  Moreover, it would be false to ascribe the belief that 9
Clark Kent can fly to A because, despite the co-reference of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, 
A does not believe this.  Although B’s report has the same propositional content as A’s 10
original utterance, the report is nonetheless false because it does not reflect what A 
believes. Given this, it looks as if indirect reports are in fact opaque. 
 On the other hand, B is not reporting what A believes; B is reporting what A said. 
It seems plausible that in the context of B’s utterance, B and her audience know that 
Superman = Clark Kent. They might know about Clark Kent’s secret identity and know 
that A does not possess such knowledge. Imagine for a moment that, in the reporting 
context, it is common knowledge that Superman = Clark Kent, but the extent of 
Superman’s powers is not common knowledge. Under such a description, B might be 
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 There is a substantial literature on belief ascription given co-referential substitution. For a good 10
discussion please see Jennifer Saul (1998).
making a reasonably informative report. This suggests that indirect reports are not 
opaque.  
 The discrepancies in indirect reports prompt us to conclude that the opacity of 
indirect reports cannot be semantically analyzed in the same way as direct reports. 
Whether or not indirect reports are opaque depends on pragmatic principles and 
contextual features. In particular, it depends on the common knowledge that exists 
between reporter and audience and the communicative goal that the reporter has.  
  !
2.6.Mixed reports !
It is difficult to get far in a survey of indirect reports without recognizing that a great deal 
of reporting takes the form of a mixed report, or a mixed quotation. The analysis of 
mixed reports borrows from analyses of quotation and analyses of indirect reports. 
Consider this standard example: 
(21) Quine said that quotation “has a certain anomalous feature.”  !
One might claim that a mixed report such as (21) does not have the same pragmatic 
latitude as a pure indirect report. Further, one might claim that (21) requires, at the very 
least, that Quine used the particular locution, “has a certain anomalous feature,” and not 
just that Quine uttered an identical speech act type with translatable propositional 
content. Is a pragmatic account committed to denying this?  This is an interesting 11
question, and the answer to it turns on what is being reported in any given report—direct 
or indirect (see Section 2.9). It seems arbitrary to presuppose that quotation marks are 
supposed to capture locutional accuracy rather than accuracy of content, motivation, tone, 
or purpose. What is being aimed for in any given report might depend on the 
conversational goals of the reporter and audience. This is not to deny that locutional 
accuracy is not a normative standard in many settings (e.g., journalism or academic 
papers). This is compatible with it being far less normative in everyday discourse, 
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particularly when that discourse is verbal (see Section 3.1) and the quotation marks are 
implied, gestured, or marked in some other way.  
While mixed reports might be particularly semantically troublesome, they are less 
so under a pragmatic analysis. The quoted phrase indicates that the reporter is 
establishing distance between herself and the original utterance (i.e., she is mentioning 
and not using this utterance), and that she is doing so in such a way as to establish that 
her report is accurate along some dimension relevant to the reporting context. If the 
reporting context is journalistic or academic, it is very likely that her report will be true 
only if what falls between the quotation marks is an identical locution to that which was 
uttered by the original speaker. Given that the starting point of a pragmatic analysis 
concerns the conversational goals of the speakers, and given that the principal pragmatic 
measure of reports is felicity (and not truth per se), the mixed report is analyzed as any 
report would be. The reading of quotation marks under this analysis of indirect reports is 
just that they draw special attention to (or distance from) some portion of the report. The 
reporter has already established that she is not using this language (by way of the phrase 
‘said that’) and, further, that she is using quotation marks to re-affirm that point with 
respect to a particular passage.  
This way of interpreting the mixed report makes less of the differences between 
the direct report, the mixed report, and the indirect report. Quotation in a mixed report is 
a means of establishing both accuracy and distance with respect to the original report. But 
quotation itself can operate on various levels, from locution to illocution and even to 
perlocution. A pragmatic analysis should be ready to recognize this. (See section 2.9.) 
!
2.7.Indirect reports as social objects !
The analyses offered in 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 of propositional content in reports, opacity, and 
quotation marks are undoubtedly unconventional. Many of the claims are defiant of a 
straightforward semantic analysis of the phrase ‘said that’. And yet they may be most 
appropriate for a pragmatic perspective on these phenomena. One of the reasons is that 
pragmatics, as a discipline, is disinclined (relative to semantics as a discipline) to concern 
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itself with the utterance in isolation. It is far more concerned with what has variously 
been called the context or the situation of utterance. And contexts and situations are 
usually social events. They involve a reporter, an audience, a place, goals, and past 
conversation. They also involve cognitive mechanisms, loads, limits, and predispositions. 
The pragmatist is more likely to situate the report in the reporting context with a 
simultaneous representation of the original situated speech act.  
 On the face of it, this seems like an appropriate approach for the analysis of 
indirect reports. After all, they explicitly involve the recreation and representation of what 
someone else said, and often what they meant, why they said it, and how they said it, all 
while maintaining the report’s relevance to the current speech situation. As a speech act, 
it’s explicitly intercontextual and metarepresentational. The challenge is to maintain 
accuracy of description of the speech act itself while maintaining cognitive, empirical 
plausibility. Talk of context and situation and multi-level representations is widespread.  12
Yet I do not think there is a decisive account of these terms that maintains empirical 
plausibility—for example, the account of metarepresentation needs to characterize the 
semantic and pragmatic function of a report without proposing a structure of 
representation that is implausibly complicated. (See section 3.2 for further discussion.) 
!
2.8.As pragmatic vehicles: humor, irony, insult, praise !
Indirect reports are used as a number of different kinds of pragmatic vehicles. They are 
also affected by the non-literal content of the original speech act. Irony presents a clear 
case for the need for a pragmatic account of indirect reports. Consider this case:  13
!
(22) After a really bad philosophy talk, A says: 
A: That was, like, really good. 
*B1: A said that the talk was really good. 
B2: A said that he didn’t like the talk much. !
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 Originally in Larson, R. & Segal, G. (1995). Quoted in Cappelen & Lepore, (1997b), pg. 284.13
Even if we might say that B1 literally reports what A said, we recognize that it is an 
infelicitous report of A’s utterance since A was using irony. A reasonable constraint on the 
practice of reporting is that consistency of speech act type be maintained.  If an 14
utterance is meant to be ironic, the report is infelicitous if it reports that utterance 
literally. For example, Romeo says that Juliet is the sun, and Mercutio reports: “Romeo 
said that Juliet is the sun. But she’s not a giant ball of fire. So Romeo said something 
false.” Mercutio’s report is clearly infelicitous because it fails to treat Romeo’s original 
utterance as figurative. Likewise, Mercutio’s conclusion that Romeo has said something 
false is also clearly wrong. If a speaker uses an interrogative and is reported as having 
made an assertion, the report is, again, infelicitous. (Such reports could be made 
felicitous by substituting ‘said that’ with the appropriate term, ‘asked whether’, ‘joked 
that’, etc.) 
 However, some indirect reports use the act of reporting in order to insult, praise, 
or perform other speech acts. In doing so, the reporter does not maintain speech act 
consistency with the original utterance. It’s arguable that if the reporter did so, the report 
would not serve its purpose—namely, to insult, praise, etc. Consider this use of humor, 
insult, and scorn in the report but not in the original speech act.  
 (23) 
A: I voted for Sarah Palin. 
B: A said that she voted for Caribou Barbie. !
Now there’s a clear sense in which A did not say that she voted for Caribou Barbie—after 
all, there is no such person. But there are also easily recognizable contexts in which B and 
her audience recognize that ‘Sarah Palin’ and ‘Caribou Barbie’ are co-referential even if 
‘Caribou Barbie’ is not the conventional name for Sarah Palin (rather, it’s a mildly 
insulting moniker). Is this just like any other case of co-referential substitution? A could 
readily object that she did not say that she voted for ‘Caribou Barbie’, especially since 
she likely finds that name insulting. This example suggests that there is a general 
constraint that consistency of speech act content be maintained; but it is the violation of 
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this constraint that, in part, makes B’s utterance humorous or insulting. It is the very 
recognition of constraints on such reporting practices that makes these kinds of non-
literal reports possible through pragmatic manipulation.  
 There is a related phenomenon in the use and analysis of slurs. (Note that (23) is 
not an example of a slur, but rather an insult or expression of scorn and contempt.)  15
There is reasonable debate as to whether a report of a slurring expression is itself 
offensive—or as offensive, or offensive in the same way as the original use of the slur. If 
a speaker were to report the slurring speech of another, it’s reasonable to think that the 
speech is being used mentioned and not used (see section 2.1). As such the reporter is not 
slurring in reporting the use of a slurring term. Speakers often resist this, however. In 
reporting on the surprising use of a slurring term, speakers might say, “A said that she is a
—I can’t bring myself to use the word,” or “A said that he is an ‘n-word’”—in each case 
the speaker is unwilling to even repeat the slur in question for fear of using the slur 
inadvertently. This may be explained by the possibility that some speakers regard slurring 
terms as non-referring. If they report the original utterance, using the slurring term, the 
speakers may regard this is an endorsement of the slurring term—at the very least as an 
endorsement of its referential status. This maintains the insight that reports are acts of 
mentioning and not using; but simultaneously explains why reporters are hesitant to even 
report on others’ slurs.  
!
!
2.9.What is an indirect report reporting? !
As discussed in section 2.1, indirect reports differ from direct reports at least insofar as 
they lack conventional markings in written texts. (Some have suggested that implied 
quotation marks are essential features of verbal direct reports as well.) It is also clear that 
the expression ‘said that’ and its corollaries mark a report and establish pragmatic 
distance between the current speaker and the reported speech. This presents two related 
questions: what is doing the reporting and what is being reported? 
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The literature on quotation might be informative here, although it is not going to 
answer our questions directly. In the analysis of quotation, some have claimed that 
whatever is inside of quotation marks is a name (or is being named).  As such, the 16
quoted expression is unanalyzable. This improbable view of quotation has been widely 
rejected. Another view of quotation treats quotation as a description of an earlier 
utterance.  Both the name view and the description view (as we might call them) tell us 17
more about the report (or quote) than they do about what the report (or quote) is operating 
on. Neither give us clear account of what is being reported, whether locution, 
propositional content, speech act, etc. Neither the name view nor the descriptive view are 
defended as plausible accounts of quotation anymore.  
No clear winner has dominated the contemporary quotation literature, but there 
are three major contenders: the demonstrative theory, the disquotational theory, and the 
use/identity theory.  Although each of these views primarily provides a semantic analysis 18
of quotation marks themselves, we can look to them to get an answer to the question of 
this section as well. The demonstrative theory tells us that quotation marks are 
demonstratives referring to whatever token expression is between them. Without getting 
into the details of this view let me just point out one pertinent feature. Under this view, 
the quotation marks demonstrate something about the expression token, but don’t indicate 
what that something is. This is a semantic weakness of the view in that it underspecifies a 
general rule for the use of quotation marks. But it is a pragmatic strength of the view in 
that it ties the something to the goals of the speaker, the common knowledge between 
speaker and audience, the relevant features salient in the reporting context, and so on. The 
use/identity theory of quotation also has an answer to the question of this section. It 
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claims that by using quotation marks (implicitly or explicitly), a speaker mentions the 
same token being uttered between the quotation marks. (As this view has developed, its 
defenders have claimed that it might also mention a type or a shape of an expression, or 
even something more loosely related.) The central claim of this theory is that quotation 
marks (and perhaps all reports) just serve to indicate that mentioning and not using is 
taking place. 
 In the case of indirect reports specifically, the problem is slightly different. Given 
that there is no claim to direct reporting, it is unnecessary to suppose that the report looks 
like or names the original utterance in some exact way, or that what follows the locution 
‘said that’ is disquotationally equivalent to the original utterance. In fact, indirect reports 
don’t function in that way at all. Indirect reports shift with context (see section 2.2), allow 
for paraphrase and inter-substitution of co-referential terms (see section 2.4), and are not 
bothered by translation. Given this, the direct report is only a “picture” of the original 
utterance if one squints.  
So what is the locution ‘said that’ reporting? The literature on quotation has been 
focused on the locution itself—quotes somehow refer to a series of words in a particular 
order—because this is a way of thinking about quotation that strongly resonates. Work on 
indirect reports has been less concerned with the locution and more concerned with the 
content and the speech act that delivers that content. If we think of what is being reported 
as a contentful speech act, there are still a number of possibilities for how to think of the 
report. For example, the report might be of the type instantiated by the original token 
expression, a type otherwise related to the original token (through paraphrase or 
inference, perhaps), some other token related to the reported token, or the original token 
itself. It could be that an indirect report is less directed toward conveying a contentful 
speech act than in the concepts contained in the reported expression, or some other 
possibility. It’s not altogether clear that we can choose only one of these options, since 
what is reported may be a representation of the original utterance either in form (broadly 
speaking) or content (broadly speaking), depending on the reporter’s goals. The great 
diversity among reports leaves the question of this section far more open than it has been 
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treated in the literature on quotation. For example, indirect reports, in their pragmatic 
guise, can be used to report on the tone of voice, accent, or attitude of the original 
speaker. The goal in making the report may not be accurate representation, but humor, 
scorn, irony, etc. (see section 2.8). In these cases, propositional content and replication of 
the original locution may be insignificant.  
Some have argued that indirect reports must always report the minimal 
propositional content of the original utterance.  This is to say that no matter what the 19
report is doing in terms of the conversational goals of the reporter or audience 
expectations, the report is only a felicitous report if minimal propositional content is 
preserved in the reporting. Consider the following exchange:  
(24)  
A: The cat is on the mat. 
  B: A said that the cat is on the mat. !
Whatever B is doing by reporting A’s utterance, she reports that A said that the cat is on 
the mat and B’s report is true iff A said that the cat is on the mat. This seems plausible, 
dully so, on its face. But in making this claim the defenders of this view also make the 
claim that any given utterance may communicate any number of other propositions in 
addition to the minimal one that can be linguistically decoded from the original utterance. 
Here’s a further elaboration of this position, from Cappelen & Lepore: 
‘What an utterance of (1) says depends in part on the contextually salient comparison class, 
standards of measurement, and other such things. 
(1) Serena is really smart. 
...Suppose all we tell you is that Venus uttered (1). We predict the following: 
• There is a sense in which you can understand what Venus said, viz. that Serena is really 
smart. 
• You can repeat what Venus said, i.e. do what we’re about to do right now, viz. say the 
same as Venus did: Serena is really smart. 
• You can indirectly report Venus by uttering (2): 
(2) Venus said that Serena is really smart.’   20!
And another example of how they think content is shared between contexts: !
In some unspecified context, Herman utters: ‘Napolean was an interesting guy’. Herman thinks it 
is obviously true that other people in other contexts have said, could have said, and will say 
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exactly what Herman said with this speech act.   21!
We can imagine for these claims the extension from saying the same thing in different 
contexts to another form of content sharing—reporting. The reason they think the 
content-sharing that occurs when we report is so easy is because all instances of the same 
locution share minimal semantic content once basic ambiguities have been resolved and 
indexicals have been specified. And why not? The question of what a report is reporting 
can’t be unanswerable—this must not be the case given the ease with which we navigate 
indirect reports in conversation.   22
 If the semantic minimalists’ answer to the question of this section is just that an 
indirect report necessarily reports minimal propositional content and optionally reports a 
plurality of additional content, the pragmatic theorist on these issues should probably 
resist. It’s easy to easy why philosophers and semanticists have tended to think about 
reporting in terms of semantic identity. But the work of interpreting real world indirect 
reports has less to do with options semantically triggered by locutions such as ‘said that’ 
and more to do with speakers embedded in a context. In a given context, reporters need to 
convey some understanding or representation of the original context; simultaneously, 
they need to convey their own reasons for reporting the original utterance, and the 
relevance of the report to the current context. Sometimes the latter will simply be to 
convey information, but, oftentimes, indirect reports will be vehicles for a multitude of 
other speech acts. Wilson (2000) uses the expression “the exploitation of resemblances” 
to explain the cognitive processes in play when interpreting an indirect report. I think this 
is the correct way of thinking about it given the variety of reports introduced in this 
section. The interpreter takes into consideration some collection of clues that are 
linguistically encoded and takes into consideration contextual information that would 
lead to the most salient, least taxing interpretation (more on this in section 3). I have tried 
to emphasize thus far that this available and salient interpretation may resemble the 
original utterance in a host of ways. Many of these ways may be paralinguistic (e.g., I 
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might report on the utterance of A in order to practice my accent in A’s dialect), but they 
are nonetheless common to real world reporting practices.  
  !
3. Pragmatic accounts of indirect reports !
3.1.Corollaries with pragmatic accounts of direct reports !
How we distinguish between direct and indirect reports differs depending on what we 
think a language is. Saka (2011) distinguishes between a ‘phonocentric’ and a 
‘graphocentric’ approach to the study of language. The former he attributes to linguists, 
arguing that linguists by and large identify language as a natural, verbal (and signed) 
phenomenon. Written language is, at best, a secondary form of language, meant only to 
represent verbal speech, and perhaps not a properly linguistic phenomenon at all. The 
‘graphocentric’ approach to the study of language, on the other hand, is the approach 
most often adopted by philosophers of language, who conceive of language as an abstract 
(non-natural?) phenomenon. Philosophers of language are most likely to analyze 
linguistic reality as found in written text and to treat verbal speech as a secondary form of 
language riddled with ‘performance’ errors. Saka convincingly argues that settling 
debates about direct and indirect reports requires first settling questions about the proper 
approach to language itself. For example, consider these two examples from Recanati 
(2001, pg. 661): 
!
(25) Alice said that life is difficult to understand. 
(26) Alice said that life is ‘difficult to understand’.  !
 Recanati’s somewhat surprising claim is that, when spoken, these two sentences 
are, in fact, the same. They do not differ in linguistic meaning, but rather differ only 
paralinguistically. From a phonocentric perspective this shouldn’t be surprising. If we 
were to imagine a speaker reporting on Alice’s assertion we would hear the same thing in 
both cases. There would be nothing linguistically marked as mentioned rather than used, 
or quoted directly rather than indirectly. Of course, for philosophers of language, the use/
mention distinction is so salient, and the intuition that quotation marks themselves have a 
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semantic role is so strong, that Recanati’s claim seems preposterous. If Recanati is 
correct, or if, more generally speaking, the phonocentric approach to language is the 
correct approach, the distinction between direct and indirect reports does not dissolve, but 
it does not rely on what it has been thought to rely on—namely, the presence or absence 
of quotation marks. 
 On the other hand, when Recanati analyzes (25) and (26) graphocentrically, he 
concludes that, while there is no difference between the linguistic meanings of (25) and 
(26), the quotation marks in (26) indicate that the phrase they contain is being 
demonstrated, rather than represented in some way that differs from the meaning of 
(25).  This debate is not settled. The semantic role of quotation marks and phrases such 23
as ‘said that’ are still in question, and the pragmatics of how speakers mark off, 
demonstrate, or report other speech or text is underexplored. 
 Finally, it’s worth noting that speakers (as opposed to writers) mark the distinction 
between direct and indirect reports in a large variety of ways. Direct reports are marked 
in English with interjections such as, “and this is a direct quote,” or modifiers such as 
“literally,” or “verbatim,” or “word-for-word.” For example, the speaker in (26) may, in a 
natural speech setting say, “Alice said that life is—literally—difficult to understand.” 
This would indicate to the audience that the reporter is telling us, directly, what it is that 
Alice said.  Reporters also use air-quotes or say “quote-unquote” in order to indicate that 24
the report is direct rather than indirect, although it’s possible that this borrowing from 
written text only occurs in post-literate settings. (Saka (2011) notes that the use of air-
quotes and the phrase “quote-unquote” are often used in clumsy and incoherent ways. 
This seems right, and seems to suggest that insofar as speakers are borrowing quote-talk 
to set up a direct report they are doing it without relying heavily on the actual 
conventions of written text.) These variations in how speakers mark direct reports in 
English are evidence that they are committed to locutional accuracy, and don’t draw a 
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strong distinction between direct and indirect reports. Speakers certainly distinguish 
between loose paraphrase and strong accuracy, but it’s not obvious that they draw this 
distinction on the basis of locutional accuracy rather than on the basis of some other kind 
of representational accuracy. Getting at the heart of what is taking place in a report 
requires a more complete theory of what reporters and interpreters are each doing in the 
reporting context.   
!!
3.2.Resources for a complete pragmatics of indirect reports  !
One possible pragmatic framework for understanding indirect reports is to treat them as a 
kind of metarepresentation. The task of a reporter is to represent relevant features of the 
reported context to the audience and thereby convey something about that earlier context. 
The felicity of the report is constrained, in part, by the cognitive demands of interpreting 
the report given the current context and shared goals. It is plausible, to a certain extent, 
that the act of reporting involves having a theory of mind in order to understand what was 
said and meant in the original context, what the audience knows about that earlier 
context, and a representation of the two contexts and the respective agents’ epistemic 
attitudes toward those contexts. 
 There are a few apparent problems with analyzing indirect reports in this way. 
The first is that understanding the locution ‘said that’ appears to be a relatively simple 
cognitive process—one not requiring robust metarepresentational abilities. After all, very 
young children have the ability to deploy and interpret ‘said that’ before they have a 
fully-formed theory of mind. The second, and related, problem is that analyzing indirect 
reports as metarepresentational suggests that speakers and hearers over-represent in a way 
that is empirically implausible. Grice originally proposed such a model as described here 
by Wilson:  
For a Gricean speaker’s meaning to be conveyed the speaker’s intentions must be not merely 
recognized but transparent, in a sense that seems to be definable only in terms of an infinite series 
of metarepresentations. The speaker must not only (1) intend to inform the hearer of something, 
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and (2) intend the hearer to recognize this informative intention, but (3) intend the hearer to 
recognize the higher-order intention in (2), and so ad infinitum.   25!
This was an assumption of Gricean semantics and early intention-based semantics, albeit 
recognized as flawed from early on. Stephen Schiffer correctly describes this approach as 
“superintellectualist”:  
In Meaning I suggested that in an adequate account of declarative speaker-meaning the 
speaker must intend the audience to have what I called a “truth-supporting” (as opposed 
to a pragmatic or prudential) reason for his belief that p, but this now strikes me as an 
especially absurd instance of the superintellectualist conception of mind implicit in the 
whole IBS approach. I doubt that ordinary speakers can be relied on to have sophisticated 
beliefs about the sort of grounds they intend others to have for their beliefs. Also it now 
seems to me possible that there should be acceptable cases of meaning where the 
audience is not intended to have any reasons for the belief that the speaker intends to 
activate by his utterance.   26!
In this passage Schiffer is criticizing both the explicitly representational burden as well as 
the discursive and truth-oriented assumption in this philosophical account. Assuming that 
a speaker believes such-and-such and that his audience recognizes that he believes such-
and-such, and so on, where each such-and-such is identical in linguistic meaning and 
logical form is implausible. In the case of reporting, this superintellectualist conception of 
mind is only intensified: the reporter must convey the original speaker’s intentions 
alongside her own, with the relevant information from both contexts, all the while 
expecting her audience to recognize both the original intention, the intention in reporting, 
and the higher-order intentions ad infinitum. Even if we were to find a way of preventing 
an infinite iteration of representations, this superintellectualist metarepresentational 
account of reporting seems too cognitively demanding to be plausible.  
 While the standard view within pragmatics is that reports are best explained as a 
kind of metarepresentation, the strongest (but still underdeveloped) pragmatic account 
avoids the problems of over-representation and explicit discursivity. In the case of 
indirect reports these acts of metarepresentation are even more salient. For example, 
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A: I’m hungry.  
B1 [to C]: A said that she’s hungry. 
B2 [to C]: A said that she would like dinner now.  !
The report in B1 is more direct than the one in B2 and presumably requires minimal 
cognitive resources in order to execute it. The report in B2 is indirect and inferential. In 
this case, B understands A’s utterance, the meaning behind A’s utterance, and the 
relevance of it to C. In doing so, she infers that A would like to satisfy her hunger with 
dinner. But both B1 and B2 are candidates for felicitous reports. One possible explanation 
for this is that metarepresentation in general, and in indirect reports in particular, is 
largely non-discursively inferential and not committed to the recovery of literal meanings 
(the ‘what is said’ traditionally construed). Since it appears that young children use 
various forms of inferential reasoning as a means of language acquisition, the inferences 
themselves cannot antecedently require strong discursive abilities or the recovery of 
fully-formed literal meanings.  It should be clear that Grice was aware of these problems 27
and thought it would be sufficient that speakers and hearers regard themselves and their 
audiences as representing in the requisite ways even if they don’t actually do so. Sperber 
and Wilson (in various places) have defended a more plausible (if still cursory) account. 
Consider the following: 
Inferential comprehension starts from the recovery of a linguistically encoded sentence meaning, 
which is typically quite fragmentary and incomplete. The goal of pragmatic theory is to explain 
how the hearer, using available contextual information, develops this into a full-fledged speaker’s 
meaning. The Communicative Principle of Relevance motivates the following comprehension 
procedure, which, according to relevance theory, is automatically applied to the on-line processing 
of attended verbal inputs. The hearer takes the linguistically decoded sentence meaning; following 
a path of least effort in the accessing of contextual information, he enriches it at the explicit level 
and complements it at the implicit level until the resulting interpretation meets his expectations of 
relevance; at which point, he stops.  28!
The virtue of this account is that it is general but unified enough to make sense of the 
puzzles described in section 2. It also—to its credit—makes it easy to see how 
communication can go wrong even when linguistically encoded sentence meaning is 
readily available to both speaker and interpreter and how the same process can have 
degrees of sophistication. When an audience misunderstands a speaker—as happens—it 
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is possible that enrichment went wrong at either the explicit or implicit level or that the 
interpreter’s expectations of relevance were inappropriate. After all, these basic pragmatic 
principles are supposed to explain why it is that complicated communication (in the form 
of reports, for instance) go well much of the time but also go partially or entirely wrong 
much of the time as well.  
This account also explains the observation that I made above, namely that it 
seems as if young children are able to deploy and interpret ‘said that’ even prior to 
developing a robust theory of mind. In describing this comprehension procedure, Wilson 
notes that it is compatible with speakers of different abilities. She describes three such 
speakers who have interpretive strategies she labels naive optimism, cautious optimism, 
and sophisticated understanding.  Each interpretive strategy is associated with a 29
different level of linguistic comprehension and/or theory of mind. For example, a typical 
language learner progresses through these strategies from infancy to adulthood when 
speakers and interpreters are typically able to represent complicated theories of mind with 
respect to one’s audience and other speakers that one may be reporting. And as Wilson 
points out, these categories correspond, to a certain extent, with some of the interpretive 
obstacles encountered by autistic people. Of course, a complete pragmatic theory will 
likely propose a more finely-grained non-linear account of the possible interpretive 
strategies an interpreter might have. But it seems to me that this account, as I’ve only 
give the bare outlines of it here, is the best pragmatic (or even bolder: linguistic) 
framework for the explanation of reporting practices. However, there is still work to be 
done in philosophy and pragmatics on this meta-linguistic and meta-representational 
phenomenon. 
 Looking ahead, what will be the components of a complete theory of indirect 
reports? 
i. An account of the reporting context and the aims of that context. This would 
minimally require an understanding of the boundaries of context itself as well as 
an account of the common knowledge between reporter and audience. Of course, 
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much work has been done by pragmatic theorists to account for context itself. It 
has been beyond the scope of this paper to describe this work. My suggestion, 
moving forward, is that the reporting context differs from ordinary speech 
contexts and, as such, will be described in different terms.  
ii. A full account of the metarepresentational processes needed in order to represent 
the relevant features of the original context within the reporting context. This 
metarepresentational cognitive task requires a triple level of embedding of 
linguistic understanding, common knowledge, and conversational goals given the 
framework for comprehension described above. As indicated above, it should be 
scalar both respect to age and ability level but also context. 
iii. An account of the socio-cultural/linguistic interpretive defaults that might be 
employed interpreting or representing the original utterance as well as the 
reported utterance. This will require a tandem account of the understanding of 
socio-cultural/linguistic defaults for the act of reporting itself. 
iv. An  account, given (i), of what counts as expressing the same content. What has 
not been accounted for in this paper, but what is certainly of interest to 
philosophers, is the way in which reporting is an act that has standards of 
evaluation. In this paper I have used the broad term ‘felicity’ to describe a 
successful report. Contexts vary with respect to the required strength of fidelity 
between the original utterance and the report of this utterance. In some, but not 
all, cases it is appropriate to assess whether the report is true. In some, but not all, 
cases it is appropriate for there to be identity between the original utterance and 
the report. In other cases, the two utterances, whether in content, form, or 
something else entirely paralinguistic, need to resemble each other in some other 
way altogether. In this paper, I have argued that what counts as saying the same 
thing in the original utterance and the report will depend on the norms of 
discourse for the relevant domain and the conversational goals of the reporter and 
her audience. This implies that there is no unified analysis of ‘said that’ or its 
corollaries that is either available or desirable. However, this does not excuse 
pragmatic theory from establishing the general principles that constrain speakers 
in particular cases.  !
The principles of cooperation proposed by Grice, the general principles of relevance 
theory, alongside the few additional pragmatic principles aimed at indirect reports that 
have been proposed here and in recent work on indirect reports go a long way toward 
explaining many of the linguistic puzzles raised by indirect reports. Indirect reports are 
proving to be one of the most illuminating linguistic phenomena for understanding the 
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